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R&D Dynamics with Asymmetric Efficiency
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Abstract We consider an R&D investment function in a Cournot duopoly competi-
tion model inspired in the logistic equation. We study the economical effects resulting
from the firms having different R&D efficiencies. We present three cases: (1) both
firms are efficient and have the same degree of efficiency; (2) both firms are less
efficient and have the same degree of efficiency; (3) firms are asymmetric in terms
of the efficiency of their R&D investment programs. We study the myopic dynamics
on the production costs obtained from investing the Nash investment equilibria.
Keywords Strategic R&D · Cournot duopoly model · Patents
1 Introduction
We consider a Cournot duopoly competition model where two firms invest in R&D
projects to reduce their production costs. This competition is modeled, as usual, by a
two stages game (see [3, 6]). In the first subgame, two firms choose, simultaneously,
R&D investment strategies to reduce their initial production costs. In the second
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subgame, the two firms are involved in a Cournot competition with production costs
equal to the reduced cost determined by the R&D investment strategies chosen in the
first stage. We use an R&D cost reduction function inspired in the logistic equation
that was first introduced in [5].
We consider two firms that are identical except, at most, in their R&D investment
programs efficiency. Concerning their R&D efficiency, we study the economical
effects of three different scenarios: (1) both firms R&D investment programs are
efficient and both firms hold the same degree of efficiency. We will refer to this
case as the symmetric efficient (SE) case; (2) both firms R&D investment programs
are less efficient and both have the same degree of efficiency. We will refer to this
case as the symmetric inefficient (SI); (3) firms are asymmetric in terms of their
R&D investment programs efficiency, i.e. one of the firms has a more efficient R&D
investment program allowing bigger cost reduction under equal investment whereas
the other firm has a less efficient R&D investment program forcing it to invest more
in order to achieve the same cost reduction as the other firm. We will refer to this
case as the Asymmetric (A) case.
We present the Perfect Nash equilibria of this two stages game and we study
the economical effects of these equilibria. The second subgame, consisting of a
Cournot competition, has a unique perfect Nash equilibrium. For the first subgame,
consisting of an R&D cost reduction investment program, we exhibit four different
regions of Nash investment equilibria that we characterize as follows: a competitive
Nash investment region C where both firms invest, a single Nash investment region
S1 for firm F1, where just firm F1 invests, a single Nash investment region S2 for firm
F2, where just firm F2 invests, and a nil Nash investment region N , where neither of
the firms invest (see [5, 6]).
The Nash investment equilibria are not necessarily unique. The non uniqueness
leads to an economical complexity in the choice of the best R&D investment strategies
by the firms. For high production costs, that can correspond to the production of new
technologies, there are subregions of production costs where there are multiple Nash
investment equilibria: a region RSi∩C where the intersection between the single Nash
investment region Si and the competitive Nash investment region C is non-empty;
a region RS1∩S2 where the intersection between the single Nash investment regions
S1 and S2 is non-empty; a region RS1∩C∩S2 where the intersection between the single
Nash investment regions S1 and S2 and the competitive Nash investment region C
is non-empty. When we compare the cases symmetric efficient (SE) and symmetric
inefficient (SI), we observe that, in the SI-scenario, the single Nash investment regions
S1 and S2 increase in size and so the competitive Nash investment region C becomes
smaller. In the asymmetric case (A), we observe that the single Nash investment
region S2 of firm F2 is considerably bigger due to its advantage in the R&D cost
reduction program efficiency.
We present the R&D deterministic dynamics on the production costs of the
Cournot competition, based on the R&D investment strategies of the firms, as fol-
lows: at every period of time, the firms choose the investment corresponding to one
of the Nash investment equilibria that determines the new production costs of the
firms. Hence, the implicit equations determining the R&D deterministic dynamics
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are distinct in the competitive Nash investment region C and in the single Nash
investment regions S1 and S2 (see Theorems 1 and 2 in [5]). The nil Nash investment
region N determines the set of all production costs that are fixed by the dynamics.
Depending upon the initial production costs of both firms and upon their R&D invest-
ment strategies, the nil Nash investment region N is the set of equilibria for the R&D
deterministic dynamics. It is unusual in dynamical systems to have a non-isolated set
of equilibrium points. This is due to the complex investment structure that we have to
deal in these problems and to the lower bound in investment (economically, it must
be non negative). The competitive Nash investment region determines the region
where the production costs of both firms evolve, for both firms, along the time. The
single Nash investment region S1 (resp. S2) determines the set of production costs
where the production cost of firm F2 (resp. F1) is constant, along the time, and just
the production costs of firm F1 (resp. F2) evolve that may lead Firm F2 (resp. F1) to
bankruptcy or that may allow it to recover from an initial disadvantage.
2 R&D Investments on Costs
The Cournot duopoly competition with R&D investments on the reduction of the
initial production costs consists of two subgames in one period of time. The first
subgame is an R&D investment program, where both firms have initial production
costs and choose, simultaneously, their R&D investment strategies to obtain new
production costs. The second subgame is a Cournot competition with production
costs equal to the reduced cost determined by the R&D investment program. As it is
well known, the second subgame has a unique perfect Nash equilibrium.
2.1 The R&D Program
We consider an economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, F1 and F2, each
one producing a differentiated good. The inverse demands pi are linear:
pi = α − βqi − γ q j , (1)
with parameters α > 0, β > 0 and γ . We assume that γ > 0 and thus the goods are
substitutes. The firm Fi invests an amount vi in an R&D program ai : R+0 → [bi , ci ]
that reduces its production cost to
ai (vi ) = ci − ε(ci − cL)vi
λi + vi . (2)
Next, we explain the parameters of the R&D program: (i) the parameter ci is the
unitary production cost of firm Fi at the beginning of the period satisfying cL ≤ ci ≤
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α; (ii) the parameter cL is the minimum attainable production cost; (iii) the parameter
0 < ε < 1 has the following meaning: since bi = ai (+∞) = ci − ε(ci − cL), the
maximum reductionηi = ε(ci − cL) of the production cost is a percentage 0 < ε < 1
of the difference between the current cost ci and the lowest possible production cost
cL ; (iv) the parameter λi > 0 can be seen as a measure of the inverse of the quality
of the R&D investment program for firm Fi and is directly related to what we call
efficiency of the R&D investment program that we define next (a smaller λi will
result in a bigger reduction of the production costs for the same investment). The
R&D investment program of firm F1 is more efficient than the R&D investment
program of firm F2 if and only if with the same investment v1 = v2 = v, the new cost
obtained by firm F1, a1, is smaller or equal to the new cost obtained by firm F2, a2,
i.e. a1(v) ≤ a2(v). This R&D program was first introduced in [5].
2.2 Optimal Output Levels
The profit πi (qi , q j ) of firm Fi is given by
πi (qi , q j ) = qi (α − βqi − γ q j − ai ) − vi , (3)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i ̸= j . The Nash equilibrium output (q∗1 , q∗2 ) is given by
q∗i =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0, i f Ri ≤ 0
Ri , i f 0 < Ri < α−a jγ
α−ai
2β , i f Ri ≥ α−a jγ
, (4)
where
Ri = 2β(α − ai ) − γ (α − a j )4β2 − γ 2 ,
with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i ̸= j . Hence, if Ri ≤ 0 the firm Fj is at monopoly output level
and, conversely, if Ri ≥ (α − a j )/γ the firm Fi is at monopoly output level and for
intermediate values 0 ≤ Ri < (α − a j )/γ , both firms have positive optimal output
levels and so we are in the presence of duopoly competition. From now on, we will
always consider that both firms choose their Nash equilibrium output (q∗1 , q∗2 ).
2.3 New Production Costs
The sets of possible new production costs for firms F1 and F2, given initial production
costs c1 and c2 are, respectively,
A1 = A1(c1, c2) = [b1, c1] and A2 = A2(c1, c2) = [b2, c2],
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where bi = ci − ε(ci − cL), for i ∈ {1, 2}. The R&D programs a1 and a2 of the firms
determine a bijection between the investment region R+0 × R+0 of both firms and the
new production costs region A1 × A2, given by the map
a = (a1, a2) : R+0 × R+0 → A1 × A2
(v1, v2) +→ (a1(v1), a2(v2))
where
ai (vi ) = ci − ηi vi
λi + vi .
We denote by W = (W1,W2) : a(R+0 × R+0 )→ R+0 × R+0
Wi (ai ) = λi (ci − ai )
ηi − (ci − ai )
the inverse map of a.
The new production costs region can be decomposed, at most, in three discon-
nected economical regions characterized by the optimal output level of the firms:
M1 The monopoly region M1 of firm F1 that is characterized by the optimal output
level of firm F1 being the monopoly output and, so, the optimal output level
of firm F2 is zero;
D The duopoly region D that is characterized by the optimal output levels of both
firms being non-zero and, so, below their monopoly output levels;
M2 The monopoly region M2 of firm F2 that is characterized by the optimal output
level of firm F2 being the monopoly output and, so, the optimal output level
of firm F1 is zero.
The boundaries between the duopoly region D and the monopoly region Mi are lMi
with i ∈ {1, 2} and are presented, explicitly in [5].
In equilibrium, i.e. when both firms choose their optimal output levels, the profit
function πi : Ai × A j → R of firm Fi , in terms of its new production costs (a1, a2),
is a piecewise smooth continuous function given by
πi (a1, a2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
πi,Mi , if (a1, a2) ∈ Mi
πi,D, if (a1, a2) ∈ D
−Wi (a1, a2), if (a1, a2) ∈ Mj
,
where
πi,Mi = πi,Mi (a1, a2; c1, c2) = (α − ai )
2
4β
− Wi (a1, a2),
πi,D = πi,D(a1, a2; c1, c2) = β
(
2β(α − ai ) − γ (α − a j )
4β2 − γ 2
)2
− Wi (a1, a2).
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2.4 Nash Investment Regions
Let Vi (v j ) be the best investment response function of firm Fi to a given investment
v j of firm Fj . The best investment response function Vi : R+0 → R+0 of firm Fi
is explicitly computed in [5]. Note that the best investment response function Vi :
R+0 → R+0 can be a multi-valued function.
Let cL be the minimum attainable production cost and α the value to buyers.
Given production costs (c1, c2) ∈ [cL ,α]× [cL ,α], the Nash investment equilibria
(v1, v2) ∈ R+0 × R+0 are the solutions of the system{
v1 = V1(v2)
v2 = V2(v1)
where V1 and V2 are the best investment response functions computed in the previous
sections.
All the results presented, hold in an open region of parameters (cL , ε,α,β, γ )
containing the point (4, 0.2, 10, 0.013, 0.013). The parameter λi that measures the
efficiency of the R&D investment program, i.e. the smaller the λi , the more efficient
the R&D investment program, is the parameter we are interested in studying. In the
case we referred to as symmetric efficient, λi is equal to 10; in symmetric inefficient
case, λi is equal to 20; in the asymmetric case, λ1 is equal to 30 and λ2 is equal to 10.
We observe that the Nash investment equilibria consists of a unique, or two, or
three points depending upon the pair of initial production costs, as we will explain
throughout the chapter. The set of all Nash investment equilibria form the Nash
investment equilibrium set. We discuss the Nash investment equilibria by considering
the following three regions of production costs:
C the competitive Nash investment region C that is characterized by both firms
investing;
Si the single Nash investment region Si that is characterized by only one of the firms
investing;
N the nil Nash investment region N that is characterized by neither of the firms
investing.
3 Nash Investment Equilibria Under Asymmetric
Efficiency
In this chapter we compare the Nash investment equilibria choices of the two firms
under three different scenarios: (i) symmetric efficient (SE) scenario where both
firms R&D investment programs’ are efficient and both firms hold the same degree
of efficiency; (ii) symmetric inefficient (SI) scenario where both firms R&D invest-
ment programs’ are less efficient and both firms hold the same degree of efficiency;
aapinto@fc.up.pt
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Fig. 1 Full characterization of the Nash investment regions in terms of the firms’ initial production
costs (c1, c2). The monopoly lines lMi are colored black. The nil Nash investment region N is
colored grey. The single Nash investment regions S1 and S2 are colored blue and red, respectively.
The competitive Nash investment region C is colored green. The region where S1 and S2 intersect
are colored pink, the region where S1 and C intersect are colored light blue and the region where S2
and C intersect are colored yellow. The region where the regions S1, S2 and C intersect are colored
light grey. (a) Symmetric efficient case. (b) Symmetric inefficient case. (c) Asymmetric case
asymmetric (A) scenario where one of the firms possesses a more efficient R&D
program and the other firm possesses a less efficient R&D investment program.
We observe the existence, in the three distinct cases, of four different regions
of Nash investment equilibria: a competitive Nash investment region C where both
firms invest, a single Nash investment region S1 for firm F1, where just firm F1
invests, a single Nash investment region S2 for firm F2, where just firm F2 invests,
and a nil Nash investment region N , where neither of the firms invest.
Let R = [cL ,α]× [cL ,α] be the region of all possible pairs of productions costs
(c1, c2). Let Ac = R − A be the complementary of A in R. The intersection between
different Nash investment regions can be non-empty: (i) the intersection RS1∩S2 =
S1 ∩ S2 ∩ Cc between the single Nash investments regions S1 and S2 can be non
empty; (ii) the intersection RC∩Si = C ∩ Si ∩ Scj with i ̸= j between the competitive
Nash investment region C and the single Nash investment region Si can be non-
empty; (iii) the intersection RS1∩C∩S2 = S1 ∩ C ∩ S2 between the competitive Nash
investment region C and the single Nash investment regions S1 and S2 can be non-
empty (Fig. 1).
Let us consider the region of high production costs, that can correspond to the
production of new technologies, where there are multiple Nash investment equilibria.
In this section, we exhibit the production costs that correspond to the existence of
multiple Nash investment equilibria.
We observe that the intersection RS1∩S2 = S1 ∩ S2 ∩ Cc between the single Nash
investments regions S1 and S2 is non empty. Thus, in this region we have two equi-
libria: a single Nash investment equilibrium to firm F1 and a single Nash investment
equilibrium to firm F2. We also observe that the intersection RC∩Si = C ∩ Si ∩ Scj
with i ̸= j between the competitive Nash investment region C and the single Nash
investment region Si is non-empty. Therefore, in this region we have two Nash
investment equilibria, one single Nash investment equilibrium for firm F1 and
a competitive Nash investment equilibrium. Finally, we see that the intersection
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Fig. 2 Nash investment regions in the high production costs region, ci ∈ [9, 10], with i ̸= j ; (a)
Symmetric efficient case. (b) Symmetric inefficient case. (c) Asymmetric case
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Fig. 3 Dynamics on the production costs in terms of the initial production costs (c1, c2): in blue,
the dynamics in the single Nash investment region for firm F1, S1 where just firm F1 invests; in
red the dynamics in the single Nash investment region for firm F2, S2 where just firm F2 invests;
and in green the dynamics in the competitive Nash investment region C where both firms invest.
(a) Symmetric efficient case. (b) Symmetric inefficient case. (c) Asymmetric case
RS1∩C∩S2 = S1 ∩ C ∩ S2 between the competitive Nash investment region C and the
single Nash investment regions S1 and S2 is non-empty. Thus, we have, simultane-
ously, a competitive equilibrium, a single favorable Nash investment equilibrium for
firm F1 and a single Nash investment equilibrium for firm F2. This aspect enhances
the high complexity of the R&D strategies of the firms, for high values of initial
production costs (Figs. 2 and 3).
4 R&D Deterministic Dynamics
The R&D deterministic dynamics on the production costs of the duopoly competition
appear from the firms deciding to play a perfect Nash equilibrium in the Cournot com-
petition with R&D investment programs, period after period. The nil Nash investment
region is the set of equilibria for these dynamics (Figs. 4 and 5).
The R&D deterministic dynamics in the single Nash investment region are implic-
itly determined by Theorems 1 and 2 in [5]. Let S1 = SF1 ∪ SR1 be the single Nash
aapinto@fc.up.pt
R&D Dynamics with Asymmetric Efficiency 81
9 9.2 9.4 9.6 9.8 10
9
9.2
9.4
9.6
9.8
10
c1
c 2
8.5 9 9.5 10
8.5
9
9.5
10
c2
c 1
8.5 9 9.5 10
8.5
9
9.5
10
c2
c 1
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4 Dynamics on the production costs in the high production costs region, ci ∈ [9, 10], with
i ̸= j : in blue, the dynamics in the single Nash investment region for firm F1, S1 where just firm F1
invests; in red the dynamics in the single Nash investment region for firm F2, S2 where just firm F2
invests; and in green the dynamics in the competitive Nash investment region C where both firms
invest. (a) Symmetric efficient case. (b) Symmetric inefficient case. (c) Asymmetric case
Fig. 5 New Production costs (NPC) for both firms F1 and F2 (a1, a2) in terms of the initial
production costs (c1, c2): in green the NPC for firm F2 and blue the NPC for firm F1; in strong
green the NPC in the competitive Nash investment regionC and lighter green, the NPC in the single
Nash investment region S2; in strong blue the NPC in the competitive Nash investment region C
and lighter blue, the NPC in the single Nash investment region S1; (a) Symmetric efficient case. (b)
Symmetric inefficient case. (c) Asymmetric case
investment region of firm F1. If (c1, c2) ∈ SF1 , then just firm F1 invests along the
time. Furthermore, at some period of time, the pair of new production costs falls in
the monopoly region and so firm F2 is driven out of the market by firm F1. The pro-
duction costs approach, along the time, the region NLH . Hence, the production costs
of firm F1 approach low costs of production but the production costs of firm F2 are
always fixed at high production costs. If (c1, c2) ∈ SR1 then just firm F1 invests along
the time. So, firm F1 will recover, along the time, from its disadvantageous position.
The production costs approach, along the time, the region NLL . Hence firm F1 is
able to recover, along the time, to the region where both firms have low production
costs. The R&D deterministic dynamics in the competitive Nash investment region
are implicitly determined by Theorems 1 and 2 in [5]. In the competitive Nash invest-
ment region both firms invest along the time and the production costs converge to
the nil equilibrium region NLL . Hence, the production costs of both firms are driven
by the R&D deterministic dynamics to low production costs.
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5 Conclusions
We presented R&D deterministic dynamics on the production costs of Cournot com-
petitions based on perfect Nash equilibria of R&D investment strategies of the firms
at every period. The following conclusions are valid in some parameter region of
our model. We used an R&D investment function inspired in the logistic equation
introduced in [5] and found all Perfect Nash investment equilibria of the Cournot
competition model with R&D programs.
We described four main economic regions for the R&D deterministic dynamics
corresponding to distinct perfect Nash equilibria: a competitive Nash investment
region C where both firms invest, a single Nash investment region for firm F1, S1,
where just firm F1 invests, a single Nash investment region for firm F2, S2, where
just firm F2 invests, and a nil Nash investment region N where neither of the firms
invest.
We considered three different scenarios in terms of the firms’ R&D investment
program efficiency: a first scenario, corresponding to the one studied in detail in
[5], denominated symmetric efficient, where both firms possess an efficient R&D
investment program; a second scenario, denominated symmetric inefficient, where
both firms have an inefficient R&D program; and a third scenario, denominated
asymmetric, where one of the firms has an efficient R&D program and the other one
possesses and R&D program that is less efficient.
We showed, following [5], the existence of regions where the Nash investment
equilibrium are not unique: the intersection RS1∩S2 between the single Nash invest-
ment region S1 and the single Nash investment region S2 is non empty; the intersection
RSi∩C , with between the single Nash investment region Si and the competitive Nash
investment regionC is non empty; the intersection RS1∩C∩S2 between the single Nash
investment region S1, the single Nash investment region S2 and the competitive Nash
investment region C is non empty. In this chapter we observed the persistence of
these regions and described how these regions change as we change the efficiency
of the R&D programs of both firms.
We presented the R&D deterministic dynamics on the production costs of Cournot
competitions based on R&D investment strategies of the firms and we illustrated
the transients and the asymptotic limits of the R&D deterministic dynamics on the
production costs.
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